In the

Supreme Court of the United States

WALTER TUVELL

Petitioner

v.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

PETITION FOR REHEARING (WITH APPENDIX)

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Judicial Gath of Office

We the People of the United States, in Order to ... <u>establish Justice</u> [which includes <u>Truth</u>] ...

— U.S. Const Preamble (emphasis added)

[A]ll executive and <u>judicial</u> Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, *shall be bound* by <u>Oath</u> or Affirmation [i.e., <u>Promise</u>], to <u>support this Constitution</u> [esp. <u>law</u> (Art. III), which incorporates the <u>doctrine of stare decisis</u>]...

- U.S. Const Art VI (emphasis added)

Each <u>justice</u> or <u>judge</u> of the United States shall take the following <u>oath</u> or affirmation ...: "I, [first name] [last name], do <u>solemnly</u> <u>swear</u> (or affirm) [**promise**] that

<u>I will administer justice</u>
[unconditionally] ... So help me God."

— 28 USC §453 (emphasis added)

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
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Signing of the Constitution[†]

Constitutional Convention, Independence Hall, Philadelphia, September 17, 1787



† • Scene at the Signing of the Constitution of the United States, Howard Chandler Christy (1940); on exhibit in the U.S. Capitol Building, House of Representatives wing, east stairway.

2,3 PETITION FOR REHEARING

Pursuant to Sup.Ct.R. 44.2, petitioner hereby submits this Petition for Rehearing ("PetReh"; with Appendix, "RehApx") for review⁴ of his Petition for Writ of Certiorari ("PetWritCert") — which in turn consists of: (i) the main Petition proper ("Petition"); (ii) its Required Appendix ("ReqApx"); (iii) its two Supplemental Briefs ("SuppBrief₁", "SuppBrief₂"), with their Appendices ("SuppApx₁", "SuppApx₂").

Frankly, I suspect the Justices of this Court haven't reviewed this case/PetWritCert at all (RehApx $\wp 8f\ddagger$) — instead, relegating that task to law clerks. I cannot fathom (nor can any of the hundreds of lawyers/judges/professors/journalists/laypersons whom I've consulted) how a properly functioning Judiciary can so blithely accept such abject travesty of justice. American law is not designed (Federalist Nº78–83; U.S. Constitution) to work this way.

PLEASE: Will some/any actual/sane "Justice" kindly deign to glance at this case/PetWritCert???

^{2.} Throughout this PetReh, we employ the referential notations established throughout the PetWritCert (see Petition $\wp if 2$); and to them, we now add: $\upsilon = volume(s)$.

^{3 •} Additionally, in this PetReh, boxed Greek letters (\square \square) interspersed throughout the text refer to the *tags* defined in the **Syllogism Table**, in the *APPENDIX* \wp 1–6 *infra*. Since **the Syllogism Table is optional reading** (not required for anything in the body of this PetReh *per se*), those tags may be ignored unless/until the reader wishes to consult that Table.

^{4 •} Full or "GVR" (\omega 3f7 infra).

GROUNDS FOR THIS PETITION

Pursuant to Sup.Ct.R. 44.2, petitioner states that the grounds for this PetReh are (i) new intervening circumstances (not previously considered, postdating the PetWritCert), of (ii) substantial/controlling effect, yet (iii) arising therefrom and "fairly included therein" (Sup.Ct.R 14.1(a)) — in the (iv) "interests of justice." <u>CERTIFICATION</u>, RehApx \wp 8.

To wit, the **new circumstances** of this PetReh involve⁵ grievous wrong-doing by this Supreme Court itself — namely, false perpetuation of Constitutionally offensive error committed by the lower courts:

- Abdication of Supervision The Court has τ abdicated (refused to properly/affirmatively exercise) its ρ supervisory (self-)power over the lower courts (Sup.Ct.R. 10(a); Petition ω39).
- **Abandonment of** *Stare Decisis* The Court has was abandoned its stated policy towards the doctrine of *stare decisis* (particularly its "explicit notice/promulgation upon overrule" clause).

In our development of these grounds (ARGU-MENT/REASONS FOR GRANTING REHEARING, $\wp 3$ infra), we reason "from-first-principles" insofar as probative (philosophy of stare decisis; appeal to the Constitution; proof by deductive/syllogistic reasoning) — but no further than necessary.

^{5 ·} Modeled on the "mistake-focused" orientation of "petitions for rehearing" at the inferior appellate level (Petition ω22f37; SuppApx₁ ω25).

ARGUMENT/REASONS FOR GRANTING REHEARING

Introduction

To the extent this Court now abandons stare decisis (SJTOR), it owes America good reasons why — officially promulgated upon plenary consideration/opinion (of our PetWritCert).

This Court's breaches of (i) supervisory protocol, and of (ii) stare decisis (SJTOR), constitute **self-destructive self-contradiction** — ψ self-annihilating the raison d'être of this Court itself.

- 6 · "[The] duty [of the courts of justice] [P] must [obligatorily] be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution ["seriously wayward," which is exactly our case] void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges [of the Constitution] would amount to nothing."—Federalist No 78 (Hamilton).
- 7 Or perhaps "easy" **GVR** ("summary" grant/vacate/remand); though, GVR may not be sufficiently effective: the (summary judgment stage) GVR in the case of *Tolan* didn't prevent the wholesale slaughter of SJTOR in our case.

Review: How We Got Here

We rehearse the postures of: (I) our case-in-chief, (II) the PetWritCert, and (III) this PetReh — all in the service of highlighting how item (III) is new/different from items (I–II).

Discrimination: Our (I) underlying *substantive*/ factual case-in-chief involves **employment discrimination**/retaliation, under the ADA (Americans with Disabilities Act) (Petition \wp 7–14). This was fully briefed and argued, **winningly**⁸ (in the sense of **summary judgment SJTOR**, next \wp *infra*), in the courts below (district and appellate).

Summary Judgment: But the lower courts unilaterally/falsely aborted our case-in-chief, by committing the judicial misconduct of wholly ignoring SJTOR, excluding all the representations of fact proffered by petitioner/plaintiff in his PSOF (Plaintiff's Statement of Facts = ReqApx \(\rho 48-84 \)). That ignorance/arrogance/lie of willfully excluding the PSOF was fully briefed and proven, "winningly," in (II) PetWritCert (Petition \(\rho 20-26 \); SuppBrief_1; SuppBrief_2). Because of that misconduct, our case-in-chief is now necessarily "parked," its fact-based substantive domain playing no role in the PetWritCert presented to this Court, beyond the incidental.

^{8 ·} Said "winning-ness" <u>is not in question</u> — it's <u>trivially/incontestably</u> correct/true (not subtle at all) — it's "IOTTMCO" ("Intuitively <u>Obvious</u> To The Most Casual Observer"). <u>The lower court's Op is a "factual" lie from beginning to end.</u>

^{9 ·} IOTTMCO.

Breaking Procedural Rule: For the reasons just stated, the questions presented to this Court in the PetWritCert reside solely in the lower courts' bald breaches of the **rule-based** *procedural domain:*

- Summary judgment under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: (i) FRCP 56(a) (Petition

 ρ17) and (ii) First Circuit D.Mass Local Rule FRCP-LR 56.1 (Petition

 ρ6); and, its concomitant ...

Repeating again: these procedural/SJTOR aspects of the case have already been fully briefed and **proven, IOTTMCO,** in PetWritCert (passim).

Silent/Implicit Overruling Of Precedent: As just noted, items (I–II) &4 supra have been fully briefed and demonstrated in PetWritCert, winningly. Yet, (III) this Court has silently, nonsensically/whimsically, rejected the PetWritCert. That amounts to implicit irrational self-rejection of this Court's own many long-standing precedents regarding summary judgment. Such implicit whimsicality is utterly foreign/alien to the very concept of this Court — as formulated by the Constitution (originally ratified in 1789, and continuously controlling these 227 years thereafter). This Supreme Court's false, silent, irrational whimsicality is what forms the basis of this PetReh.

Our Plea: This PetReh prays that this Court: (i) grant our PetWritCert; (ii) award it full hearing and consideration; (iii) most especially, issue an explicit published decision, rationally expressing exactly one of the following two alternatives (there existing no rational third possibility):¹¹

Either (suggested):

• Court's long-held summary judgment framework — that is, reaffirm SJTOR is still "good".

Or (discouraged):

• Explicitly articulate reasons why this Court has suddenly decided to abandon its long-held summary judgment framework — that is, explain why SJTOR is no longer "good".

The integrity of this Court is at grave risk. To do less (than implementing one of the alternatives supra) would be boundlessly: cowardly; hypocritical; untrustworthy; unaccountable; cynical; shameful; corrupt; ethically unconscionable; morally bankrupt; intellectually dishonest; psychologically insane; etc. America begs you: please don't go there. If you don't fix this now, it'll just get worse: normalized contamination and decay (RehApx \(\rho 8f\frac{1}{2}\psi*).

^{11 ·} Continued *implicit silence* (denial) is assuredly *not* a "rational" option.

^{12 ·} Courts are entitled to opinions, not (!!!falsified!!!) facts.

Argument/Reasons For *Denying* Rehearing

There are none.

Despite diligent research, petitioner has (not surprisingly) failed to unearth even a single incipient scintilla of potentially viable rationale justifying this Court's denial (*implicit or explicit*) of PetWritCert/PetReh (i.e., of knowing wholesale rejection of the precedential summary judgment SJTOR framework).

To the stark contrary, petitioner *has* discovered a plethora of irresistible well-developed reasons for granting PetWritCert/PetReh. The remainder of this section on *ARGUMENT/REASONS FOR GRANTING REHEARING* consists of a *précis* of reasons to grant PetWritCert/PetReh. ¹³

Philosophy Of Stare Decisis

We have no need here for a deep mastery of **jurisprudence** (philosophy of law), <u>except</u> for its core concept of **stare decisis** (= principle of reliance upon **precedent** (necessarily <u>promulgated</u>)), for which we offer a "1L" (first-year law student) primer/refresher (since the lower courts, and now this Court too, seem to have lost sight of it).

^{13 •} The presented *précis* could be elaborated into a long scholarly essay, weaving its various individual points together with the argument threads internally connecting them. A full exercise in that vein is unnecessary (less effective) for the purposes of this PetReh. *But*, a detailed *outline* of such an exercise *is* offered, in the **Syllogism Table** (introduced in $\wp 1f3$ *supra*).

In the sense applicable for us, \square the (rule of) law, in its practical/realistic aspect, is the pervasive set of prescriptive rules of conduct (laws), established/promulgated/enforced by accepted authority, according to which interacting entities in \square civilized human societies resolve disputes (legally). To be legitimate, laws must be rooted in (proper)¹⁴ human morality (justice, fairness, impartiality) — "dictated by God himfelf ... no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this" (Blackstone ν I \wp 41, "f" = "s").

In our modern Western world, **primary** (**first-tier**) laws arise from **law-givers** (constitution, legislature, executive). Some primary laws fit "squarely" (*perfect | on-point match*) the disputed (~"simple") circumstances (**cases**) for which they are designed. But borderline (~"complex") cases arise, which don't fit nicely into the existing legal regime.

Such mis-fit cases give rise to **secondary** (**second-tier**, "**common**") laws, derived by **law-inter-preters/deciders** (judiciary). For resolutions of such cases to be accepted as legitimate, adjudicatory mechanisms must be based upon human *rationality* (*deductive reasoning, non-arbitrary judgment*). The only universally human-cognizable principle for achieving such rational judgment is <u>comparison/analogy</u> with <u>similar cases</u> (albeit with all-too-human imperfection/uncertainty): "[I]t is an eftablished rule to abide by former *precedents* [previous things]" (*Blackstone* vI\sigma 69, "f" = "s"). This confers

^{14 ·} Ignoring illegitimate/perverted societies (such as Nazism).

legitimacy (non-whimsicality), plus a desirable degree of **certainty/stability/finality** ($\wp 9f16$).

Thus is born the sine qua non legal doctrine of stare decisis (et non quieta movere), freely translated as, "stand by decided matters (and do not quietly disturb the calm)": Similar cases (with similar material facts) are to be settled in similar ways—except for good reasons, widely promulgated. Stare decisis provides default guidance and justification for the hierarchy (more vs. less authoritative) of courts. It is comprised of two tenets:

- Strong tenet (binding, authoritative, mandatory) Within a jurisdiction, decisions of lower-level courts are <u>compulsorily</u> bound by precedents of higher- or same-level courts, <u>no further justification being required</u>.
- Weak tenet (advisory, persuasive, discretionary) Same-level courts within a jurisdiction, or any-level courts in disparate jurisdictions, are only optionally bound by precedents, given "sufficient" justification, promulgated.

<u>β Without respect for stare decisis, the very concept of "the (rule of) law" itself ceases to exist as a viable human construct/enterprise.</u>

^{15 •} Absent extraordinary circumstances, such as advancement or erosion of the policy/political/societal climate (e.g., disapprobation of slavery *et seq*).

^{16 ·} Law <u>is</u> predictability (reduction of uncertainty) of what courts will decide. — Paraphrase of: "The prophecies of

U.S. Constitution, Article III

The Supreme Court is ultimately $\boxed{\varepsilon}$ "defined" by (derives its authority from) the $\boxed{\gamma}$ U.S. Constitution Article III¹⁷ §1–2 (relevant part, emphasis added):

The [judicial power¹⁸ of the United States, shall be vested in one **Supreme Court**, and ... shall extend to n all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution¹⁹ [and] the laws of the United States ...

That is, (i) Article III explicitly binds the very definition of this Supreme Court to the concept of the law itself. And in turn, as we have just seen $supra \ \wp 9$, (ii) the very concept of the law ineluctably encompasses the doctrine of $stare\ decisis$. Thus, we conclude that Θ (iii) this Supreme Court is perforce subject/captive to the legal doctrine of $stare\ decisis$ — by Constitutional definition.

what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law," *The Path of the Law* ω461.

- 17 Augmented by (i) the Article VI Supremacy Clause ("This Constitution, and the laws of the United States ..., shall be the supreme law of the land [the δ 'bible', so-to-speak] ..."), and amended by (ii) Amendment XI.
- 18 · Judicial power is the power to interpret/decide justiciable (non-moot) cases and controversies in conformity with the law, via the methods established by the usages and principles of the law. Paraphrase of: Prentis \wp 226; Muskrat \wp 361; SEC v. Medical Commission passim.
- 19 \bigcirc National constitution = frame(work) of government.

The Court's Self-View Of Stare Decisis

No only by (i) philosophical precept ($\wp 9 \ supra$), and by (ii) Constitutional edict ($\wp 10 \ supra$), but even by (iii) self-proclamation, Θ this Court has many times expressly affirmed its own (and other courts') sworn²⁰ fidelity/fealty to the principle of *stare decisis*.

In accord with the weak tenet of stare decisis ($\wp 9$ supra), the Supreme Court has the power to **over-rule** its own precedent (and does so on necessary occasions, lest errors perpetuate, e.g. $\wp 9f15$). Such overrulings are major-to-blockbuster (even landmark) cases, not minor course corrections;²¹ they must be explicitly **promulgated** (not implicit/silent, nor merely mumbled in dicta), figuratively attended by all the fanfare accorded a formal papal bull.²²

For support of these propositions ((i) Supreme Court policy of self-adherence to *stare decisis*; (ii) the weak tenet's promulgation clause), it suffices to quote from *Patterson* $\wp172$ (Kennedy, J., emphasis added, internal citations and quote-marks omitted):

θ The Court has said often and with great emphasis that the doctrine of stare deci-

^{20 •} $\xi \propto By$ oath: Inside front cover, supra.

^{21 •} Example: "We conclude that, in the field of pubic education, the doctrine of 'separate but equal' [Plessey v. Ferguson] has no place." — Brown v. Board of Education φ494–495.

^{22 •} Else the thicket becomes just too gnarly. *Example:* It was long "thought" that *Diehr* "overruled" *Flook* — until it wasn't ("un-overruled"?), per *Mayo*, *Alice*, *et al.* (patentability).

sis is of fundamental importance to the rule of law. ... [I]t is indisputable that stare decisis is a basic self-governing principle within the Judicial Branch, which is entrusted with the sensitive and difficult task of fashioning and preserving a jurisprudential system that is not based upon an arbitrary [random] discretion. ...

Our precedents are not sacrosanct, for we have overruled prior decisions where the necessity and propriety of doing so has been established. Nonetheless, we have held that θ any departure [overruling] from the doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification [not just reasoning, but also promulgation (PetApx $\wp3f5$)].

Stare Decisis Of SJTOR

This Court, times too numerous to count, has expressly pledged its own (and other courts') allegiance to the precedential properties of SJTOR (i.e., stare decisis of SJTOR"), ubiquitously. *Brunet*.

In PetWritCert, we asserted (Petition $\wp17f24$) there was no necessity to elaborate upon this proposition ("stare decisis of SJTOR") before this Court. We see no reason to revise that assertion here (PetReh). It is just-too-obvious black-letter law.²³

^{23 •} If/when this case proceeds to *merits stage* before the Supreme Court, it *may* then become appropriate to elaborate in more detail upon certain aspects of (*stare decisis* of) SJTOR.

Conclusion: Thesis; Lamentum

We conclude our *ARGUMENT/REASONS FOR GRANTING REHEARING* by summarizing and articulating its now-well-reproven findings as the following formally stated Thesis (followed by a Lamentum):

THESIS²⁴

Unless it corrects its behavior (as specified in Our Plea \wp 6, supra), with regard to this case (and so, by the principle of stare decisis, others "similar" to it) — this Supreme Court has become a ω "cancerous" appendage" to American society, supporting and committing perjurious (possibly criminal, RehApx \wp 8f‡i*) judicial misconduct, and therefore is in $\delta\delta$ urgent need of immediate emergency reformation. In that sense, the instant case manifests a ϵ scandal/crisis of Constitutional ("biblical," \wp 10f17 supra) proportions for the Court. (Literally.)

Until such time, it suffices to merely nod in the direction of unimpeachable (albeit secondary) authority: *Brunet*.

^{24 ·} If wany doubts persist about the validity of this Thesis, see the APPENDIX (Syllogism Table) for the ultimate formal/rigorous/water-tight/rock-solid (logico-legal) proof.

^{25 ·} Diseased, dangerous, virulent, malignant, metastasized, invasive, malfunctional, unsound, "broken."

LAMENTUM (JUDICIAL PERJURY)

Justice Must Be Administered

— Const; Statute; Oath (inside front cover)

[T]he law must keep its promises

O. W. Holmes (Jr.), Holmes-Laski
 Letters υΙω806, December 17, 1925

To do less — to <u>knowingly violate the oath/duty/promise to administer justice</u>²⁶ (inside front cover) — is $\[\boxed{\mathbb{E} } \]$ $\[\boxed{\mathbb{E} } \$

- The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour [only] ...
 - U.S. Const Art III §1 (emphasis added)
- To [maintain *good behavior*], it is **indispensable** that they [courts, judges] should be bound down by strict **rules** [of court] and **precedents** [stare decisis], which serve to define and point out their **duty** in **every** particular case that comes before them ...
 - Federalist №78 (emphasis added)

^{26 ·} Viz: (i) abide by rules of court; (ii) tell the truth; (iii) observe *stare decisis* — the "big violations" in our case.

^{27 · &}quot;Evil" = opposite of "good."

RehApx [1/8]

SYLLOGISM TABLE: PROOF OF THESIS

In this section, we (re-)arrange the points raised in the main body of the PetReh into a purely *formal* **proof-table of logico-legal (poly-)syllogistic reasoning.**¹ This Table as a whole (both its (i) line-by-line *propositions*, and the (ii) connective *syllogistic proofs* amongst them), is **valid beyond cavil** (with respect to the instant case/PetWritCert/PetReh, as proved therein). Thus, the Table serves the (sole) purpose of *(re-)proving* our Thesis (PetReh &13), but in a more rigorous/thorough/unassailable "linear" manner.

- 1 (i) Concerning *logico-legal thought* generally, see *Huhn*.
- (ii) "Nihil quod eft contra rationem eft licitum [nothing which is contrary to reason is lawful]. For <u>reason is the life of the Law</u>, nay, the Common Law it felf if nothing else but reason, which is to be understood of an artificiall perfection of reason gotten by long studie, observation and experience ..." Coke, \$138(97b) (unpaginated, emphasis added, "f" = "s").
- (iii) "In form, [the law's] growth is logical. The official theory [stare decisis] is that each new decision follows syllogistically from existing precedents." The Common Law ω35 (emphasis added). Note: Here, Holmes's "official" (standard, time-honored) theory (stare decisis) is speaking to the "logical form" of the law (static/humdrum/fixed precedential state of "old/existing/passive/dead" conservative law) as distinguished from the law's "animated life" (dynamic/exciting/adaptive "new/evolving/active/living" progressive law). For this latter, Holmes counters Coke's "reason/life" dictum (item (ii) supra) with his own theme: "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience [of] [t]he felt necessities of the time" (The Common Law ω1, emphasis added).

RehApx [2/8]

Tag ²	Proposition	Proof ³
α	Civilized societies must perforce incorporate <u>"the (rule of) law"</u> (else the society isn't "civilized").	<i>γ</i> ,8,8
β	The <u>doctrine of stare decisis</u> is a sine-qua-non criterion of "the law."	ρ9,9
γ	The <u>United States</u> (as a " <u>nation</u> of people <u>governed</u> by 'the law,' not men") is a modern civilized society.	$\wp10;$ $\wp10f19;$ $axiom^4$
δ	The <u>U.S. Constitution</u> defines the central set of principles/"laws" (such as <i>stare decisis</i>) by which the U.S. is <u>constituted</u> (governed).	₁ %5; ω10f17 ("bible"); β
ε	Article III of the Constitution defines the <u>Supreme Court</u> .	ρ10

- 2. These tags were introduced in $\wp1f3$.
- 3 Throughout this Table, page references (with or without footnotes) are to the main PetReh $\wp1$ –14, unless otherwise specified.
- 4 · Regarding "nation of laws not men": this derives from separation-of-powers ("segregation-of-duties," "checks-and-balances") of internal controls (enhanced societal protection from human fraud/errors): "[T]he legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them: The executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them: The judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to the end it [the government of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; later, the U.S., whose Constitution was modeled on that of Massachusetts] may be a government of laws, and not of men." Adams, Part the First, Article XXX.

RehApx [3/8]

Tag	Proposition	Proof
ζ	The Supreme Court heads ("court of last resort") one-third (<u>the Judicial Branch</u>) of the U.S. government.	<i></i> β10
η	This Court is the embodiment, in the first instance, of "the law" in the U.S.	<i></i> β10
θ	This Court supports the doctrine of stare decisis (esp. the promulgation ⁵ clause of its weak tenet, \wp 9).	β; δ; ε; η; ω3,10,11,11, 12
l	The <u>SJTOR</u> is <u>("good") "law"</u> (current, valid, well-established, not overruled) of this Court.	Petition $\wp17-20$; $\wp12$
κ	The SJTOR is subject to stare decisis (<u>"stare decisis of SJTOR"</u>).	β; ι; ω12
λ	The inferior (district and appellate) courts have violated the SJTOR (by PSOF-Exclusion).	Petition $\wp22ff$ (esp. $\wp24$)

5 · Laws must be *promulgated* (articulated/published by the authorities, and notice received by the subjects) in order to be effective (α): (i) "Those who are such that the law is not promulgated in their presence are obligated to follow the law [only] insofar as it is or can be brought to their knowledge through others, once the promulgation has been made." — Aquinas Question 90 (Of The Essence of Law) Article 4 (Is Promulgation Part of the Nature of Law?) Reply to Objection 2 (the quoted passage is available from the translator at http://www3.nd.edu/~afreddos/summa-translation/Part%201-2/st1-2-ques90.pdf). (ii) "That a law may be obeyed, it is necessary that it should be known: that it may be known, it is necessary that it be promulgated." — Bentham υΙφ157.

RehApx [4/8]

Tag	Proposition	Proof
μ	The inferior courts have violated stare decisis, "unlawfully" (contrary to the law, "illegally").	κ; λ; β
ν	The inferior courts have violated rules of court (FRCP-LR 56.1).	SuppBrief ₁ Apx $\wp 8,26$
ξ	The inferior courts have committed perjury (violation of oath of office, inside front cover).	SuppBrief ₁ Apx \wp 5,26; \wp 11 f 20; \wp 14
o	The inferior courts have committed judicial misconduct/malfeasance (and more: RehApx \rho8f\pm\partie).	β; μ; ν; ξ; φ4; SuppBriefs
π	This Court has been officially notified, in clear terms and with solid irrefutable proofs, of the inferior courts' unlawful acts (λ–o).	PetWritCert in toto, and PetReh
ρ	The Court's <u>supervisory power</u> (Sup.Ct.R 10(a)) represents an (<u>affirmative mandatory) duty</u> of this court-of-last-resort, to supervise (i.e., <u>to correct</u>) <u>"seriously wayward"</u> inferior courts.	Petition $\wp 39; \wp 2,3; \wp 3f6; \zeta;$ RehApx $\wp 8f \ddagger$

 $^{6 \}cdot$ The Court's mandatory supervisory duty ($\wp 3f6$) — (i) <u>correctional</u> (as opposed to <u>guidance</u>, such as rule-making, which is a different type of supervision), in (ii) "<u>seriously wayward</u>" cases involving "<u>manifest tenor of the Constitution</u>" (such as courts' <u>abrogation of SJTOR stare decisis</u> $\wp 3,12$ [as opposed to <u>checkfor-simple-error</u>, which is not under discussion]) — is by no means an onerous burden (especially if GVR $\wp 3f7$ is employed). Because, in practice, such supervisory power is underutilized, there being few-and-far-between opportunities to exercise it.

RehApx [5 / 8]

Tag	Proposition	Proof
σ	By refusing to grant PetWritCert, this Court has refused to correct unlawful acts of the inferior courts.	$\wp3; \pi \text{ (see item } \zeta\zeta \text{ in this Table } infra)$
τ	This Court has <u>abdicated</u> ⁷ its <u>supervisory power</u> over the lower courts' unlawful acts.	ρ; σ; ω2; ω3
υ	This Court has <u>abandoned</u> its policy toward <u>stare decisis</u> (which is unlawful).	θ; ω2; β
φ	This Court has <u>co-conspired</u> (tolerated, acquiesced, "winked-at") in <u>unlawful</u> acts of the inferior courts (which is itself <u>unlawful</u>).	τ; υ
χ	This Court's unlawful behavior is unconstitutional (in conflict with the Constitution).	φ; δ; ε; ζ; η
ψ	This Court has <u>self-annihilated</u> itself, in the sense of a properly functioning Constitutional entity.	χ; ω3
ω	Constitutionally required critical entities that seriously cease to function properly are cancerous appendages to American society.	ψ; ω13; ω13f24

^{7 •} Because: if the supervisory power isn't exercised in *this* case, then it's (literally) impossible to imaginable what kind of case will *ever* trigger it. For, the Court will never see another case involving more extreme judicial misconduct.

RehApx [6 / 8]

Tag	Proposition	Proof
αα	This Court has committed perjury (violation of oath of office, <i>inside front cover</i>).	ξ; σ; τ; υ; φ; ω11f20; ω14
ββ	This Court has become a cancerous appendage to American society.	ψ; ω; αα
γγ	Cancerous appendages to American society are in urgent need of immediate emergency <u>reformation</u> .	Axiom (survival of the Union)
δδ	This Court is in urgent need of immediate emergency reformation.	ββ; γγ; ω13
33	This case manifests a scandal/ crisis of Constitutional/ "biblical" proportions. (Really.)	δδ; φ13,14
	QED (proof of Thesis \(\rho 13 \)	
ζζ	At this point, this Court can avoid this undesired/disastrous result (ee, Thesis) — and can avoid criminal activity — in one and only one way: by negating item o supra — that is, by seriously reviewing this case/PetWritCert/PetReh. (See inside back cover.)	\$\int 6,13\$; item of is the only variable in this Table now under the Court's control; RehApx \$\int 8f\dagger\$i*

RehApx [7/8]



PLATO AND ARISTOTLE

Aristotle was the founder of scientific logic, via **syllogism** (συλλογισμός, *sullogismos*, "deduction/inference"),[‡] typified by the now-iconic (cf. *Sextus* \wp 164) "first example" (in modern set symbology):

- All men are mortal: $Men \subseteq Mortal$.
- Socrates is a man: $Socrates \in Men$.
- Therefore, Socrates is mortal: $Socrates \in Mortal$.
- † The School of Athens (representing Philosophy), Raphael (1509–1511); fresco, Vatican City, Apostolic Palace; detail. Plato (left), student of Socrates, was teacher of Aristotle (right).
- ‡ Aristotle pioneered *symbolism* (abstract letters/symbols for concrete words/terms/ideas). His *original* (*Aristotle*, 25b32–26a2) "first example" of syllogism is (*in modern symbology*):

 $A \rightarrow B \leftarrow B \rightarrow C \vdash A \rightarrow C$

RehApx [8/8]

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Sup.Ct.R. 44.2, I hereby certify that this Petition for Rehearing (PetReh) is: (i) presented in *good faith* (not for purposes of delay, obfuscation, trickery, or any other improper motive); (ii) restricted to *allowable grounds* (as outlined in the section on *GROUNDS FOR THIS PETITION*, PetReh \wp 2).

Even in the absence of (i–ii), this Petition for Rehearing would still be allowable on the basis of: (iii) the *interests of justice.*^{†,‡}

Signed: /s/ Walter Tuvell

- †• "We have consistently ruled that the *interest in finality* of litigation must *yield* where the **interests of justice** would make *unfair* the strict application of our **rules** [in this case, Sup.Ct.R. 44.4, regarding denial of Petition for Rehearing]." *United States v. Ohio Power Co.*, 353 U.S. 98–110 (1957), ℘99 (emphasis added); *sua sponte* grant of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, some sixteen months following (i) denial of the Petition, (ii) denial of timely first Petition for Rehearing, (iii) denial of out-of-time and "consecutive" second Petition for Rehearing.
- # While this Court's docket is (largely) discretionary, denial of this case/PetWritCert/PetReh is clear, objective, abuse of discretion in the sense of interests of justice. Cases involving obvious perjurious (possibly criminal*) judicial misconduct must never, ever escape the last-chance supervisory review (Sup.Ct.R. 10(a)) of this Court. {*·Systematic/coordinated/conspiratorial dis-administration/thwarting/perversion of justice and law (evidenced in this case, proven in this PetReh) bespeaks organized betrayal of our Constitutional form of government (one-third, Judicial Branch), by the Federal Judiciary itself which is criminal (if not actually treasonous) behavior: 5 USC §1331, 3333,7311(1–2); 18 USC §4,242,371,1001,1505,1519,1621–1623, 1918(1–2),2381.}



ABANDON ALL HOPE YE WHO ENTER HERE



— Gustave Doré, *The Gate of Hell*, illustration for Dante, *Inferno*, Canto III, £9 (caption *supra*) (1861)

